Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'The Impossibility of Superdupervenience' and 'An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 7. Falsehood
Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / e. or
'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell]
A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell]
Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell]
'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell]
Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / c. Grelling's paradox
A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell]